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Sometimes a historical survey is used to create a cushion of comfort
and assurance: Surely we handle problems better than our short-sighted
ancestors? But sometimes it also helps to show how difﬁcult, intractable,
and perennial many problems can be.
Proposals for international monetary reform come in two forms. First
are the innumerable practical pieces of tinkering to make crises more
soluble: better data (for instance, an improvement of the IMF’s Special
Data Dissemination Standards); more prompt and effective surveillance;
bringing the private sector into workouts; the rewriting of bond contracts
to allow the inclusion of provisions for rescheduling; or tax measures to
control short-term capital ﬂows. Second come the grand visions of
institutional reform or reordering, frequently involving a need to remodel
the relics of previous reforms. The current slogan for such discussion is
“architecture.” Sometimes the piecemeal tinkering is worked into a larger
scheme for a general reordering in order to make it appear more
politically or intellectually appealing.
EARLY EFFORTS AT REFORM
The speciﬁc debates currently conducted about the international
monetary system are quite new, a response to the shocks of the 1990s
(Mexico and East Asia), but the problems underlying these policy issues
have been contested in some form or another for a very long period of
time—at least since the beginning of “globalization,” which is a much
older process than is commonly believed and fundamentally dates back
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century, when the telegraph, the cable, and the steamship ﬁrst reached
across the oceans. It involved an increasing integration of capital, goods,
and labor markets across national frontiers. But it also provoked many
defensive and nationalistic reactions against the forces of international-
ism.
Even the countries involved in these shocks do not appear to change:
Mexico in the nineteenth century experienced a series of bankruptcies
and defaults. Before the First World War, tsarist Russia provided a model
of the political motivation behind foreign lending: French ministers
encouraged the ﬂotation of loan issues in Paris because Russia played an
increasingly vital role in French foreign policy. In 1945, the debate about
whether or not Russia would join the Bretton Woods institutions was
central for the political survival of those bodies. Even the personalities
don’t change much: The Soviet memoranda pleading for membership in
the Fund and the Bank were signed by a Mr. Gerashchenko, father of the
current Russian central bank governor. The continuity of issues lies in the
fact that many areas of the world want access to international capital. The
combination of capital import and large concentrations of political power
brings risks: The borrower, if big or powerful enough, ties the lender to
both its interests and its fortunes.
The most fundamental discussion of today focuses on capital move-
ments, which link the world economically and encourage the allocation of
investment resources to the places where they can be used most produc-
tively. Capital ﬂows have overwhelmingly positive results in terms of
generally enhanced prosperity. But short-term movements, in large
volumes, may be destabilizing and lead to herd behavior. The wish to
limit short-term movements is by no means solely a contemporary
concern. One of the reasons that countries already on the gold standard
in the nineteenth century wished to create central banks (which are not
necessary for the operation of the gold standard) was to ﬁnd a mechanism
to stop disturbances from short-term capital ﬂows. The invention of the
German Reichsbank, the predecessor of the Bundesbank, was a response
to the ﬁnancial crisis of 1873, and the Federal Reserve System itself was
a delayed product of the crash of 1907.
Any contemplation of the longer history of proposals for a sweeping
reform of the international ﬁnancial system inclines the observer to rather
pessimistic conclusions. It is not that reform per se is bad. (That is a view,
of course, sometimes held. The early nineteenth century statesman Lord
Liverpool once asked: “Reform? Why do we need reform? Aren’t things
bad enough already?”) Nor was there any shortage of good ideas in these
past discussions—there were actually quite a number, perhaps too many.
And it is not even that in practice these ideas were not realized. The
partial realization of previous reform aspirations has helped to produce a
dense thicket of institutional clogging.
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come true? To be sure, to have them come true. When dreams develop,
they may become a nightmare. The classic case for economics is Midas’s
gold. But the most common historical outcome is the partial realization of
reforms.
Take the idea of creating stability and conﬁdence, and avoiding
speculative ﬂows between different currencies or different metals,
through the institution of a single world money, a vision now associated
with Richard Cooper. The idea of a single world coinage was proposed by
Napoleon III at the 1867 International Monetary Conference. He wanted
to extend the principle of the single coinage that France had exported to
the Latin Monetary Union to the rest of mankind. The Emperor’s major
ﬁnancial ofﬁcial, Marie-Louis-Pierre-Felix de Parieu, concluded the con-
ference with a statement that the aim of the meeting had been “to lay a
sort of siege to the citadel of monetary diversity, the fall of which you
would like to behold, or, at least to gradually destroy its walls, for the
beneﬁt of the daily increasing commerce and exchanges of every descrip-
tion among the different members of the human family.”1 The German
representatives were happy to follow the Gallic lead, as were Americans
looking for a way of stabilizing the dollar in the wake of the devastation
of the Civil War. The proposals failed largely because the British
parliament refused to contemplate the very small alteration in weight and
value of the British pound that would have been needed to make the
union. So instead, by the end of the 1870s, a multiplicity of national
currencies, with different names and coinage weights, was linked through
a common metallic standard. Having arrived at different national mon-
eys, a more complicated management system was needed to handle their
interactions.
REFORM EFFORTS IN THE INTERWAR YEARS
The ﬁrst systematic attempts to institutionalize international mone-
tary cooperation came in the interwar years. At ﬁrst central bank
cooperation was informal: In particular, the Governor of the Bank of
England, Montagu Norman, and the Governor of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Benjamin Strong, met surprisingly frequently (for the
steamship age) and corresponded on terms of considerable intimacy.
“You are a dear queer old duck and one of my duties seems to be to
lecture you now and then,” wrote Strong to Montagu Norman.2 When
Strong died in 1928, Norman looked for a way of institutionalizing such
1 Cited in U.S. Congress (1879, pp. 875–76).
2 Letter from Strong to Norman, May 1, 1927. Bank of England archive, G1/421.
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came up with the Bank for International Settlements.
Is it better to introduce reform before or after a major crisis? The
rather dismal experience of the interwar years provides examples of both
dynamics: The BIS is a case of a heroic attempt to learn before a crisis,
while following the destruction of the Great Depression, a World
Economic Conference in London tried to draw the lessons after a
catastrophe, when the will to reform should have been much greater.
The task of the BIS thus lay in large part in crisis prevention. Norman
saw the prime business of the new Bank as being the “centralization of
international monetary relations, preventing excessive credit leading to
overproduction and ﬁnancing of excessive stocks and artiﬁcial mainte-
nance of prices (rubber).”3 (Norman was thinking of the abortive Steven-
son scheme, which had made rubber exports dependent on the price, had
brieﬂy raised rubber prices, and then led to overplanting and a cata-
strophic price collapse during the Depression years.) The end of collab-
oration was to “evolve a common body of monetary doctrine,” to
“smooth out the business cycle, and to contribute toward a greater
equilibrium in the general level of economic activity.” The Bank should
act to improve the international circulation of capital and provide an
answer to the excessive amount of short-term capital moving internation-
ally. One common diagnosis of the ills of the 1920s contrasted the
long-term nature of prewar international capital movements with the
volatile short-term ﬂows of the 1920s (a debate reminiscent of some
analyses of the ills of the 1990s). “To attract short-term capital to
long-term markets is another task which can only be accomplished by
identifying the policies of the Central Banks, by coordinating the move-
ments of their discount rates, by increasing the control of each in its own
market” (BIS 1935, pp. 42 & 45). The underlying idea was that the central
banks might conduct a sort of operation of twist to bring down long-term
interest rates and encourage longer-term investments.
France agreed about some of these goals. The French expert Pierre
Quesnay saw the desirability of centralizing the statistical work of the
various central banks in order to know more about the problems raised
by international capital ﬂows. But French thinking went much further
and led to a proposal that the BIS should adopt a new gold currency
(grammor) as a unit of account. The idea, characteristically French, goes
back intellectually to Napoleon III’s proposals for a world monetary
standard at the 1867 International Monetary Conference. Stripped of the
gold element, however, it also looks forward to Keynes’s discussion of an
artiﬁcial international currency, bancor, in the negotiations preceding
3 Note on conversation between Quesnay and Norman, April 24, 1930. Bank of England
archive, OV5/1.
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case of a speculative attack would not require the sales of another
currency (and hence the likelihood of transmitting the attack elsewhere).
The hopes were enormous. The BIS was the last great attempt to
establish international monetary cooperation before the Second World
War. But in fact the work of the Bank was quickly paralyzed because of
the conﬂict between the two purposes of the bank (as a mechanism for
transferring German war reparations, and as a forum for international
ﬁnancial cooperation), and because of the quick polarization between
British and French views on how the Bank should approach the question
of whether reparations were harming the world economy. By 1931 the
Bank had in practice ceased to be able to operate effectively: Its attempt
to stop the Austrian Creditanstalt crisis with a 100-million-schilling
support operation is a classic case of “too little, too late.” For the rest of
the decade, the Bank degenerated into producing high-grade analysis and
sound and sensible advice—the sure sign of a redundant institution. The
failures of the BIS discredited central banks, and the idea of international
central bank cooperation, for more than a generation. Unable to deal with
the Great Depression, central banks now evolved a new mission for
themselves, as administrators of ever more complicated exchange control
systems.
The “lessons” of the Great Depression will always be controversial.
For most contemporaries, politicians and economists, the most general
lesson concerned the destabilizing character of short-term ﬂows. This
idea provided the basis for the great reform project that culminated in the
Bretton Woods Conference.
Modern economic historians formulate their conclusions rather more
cautiously: After all, the capital ﬂows were responding to policy signals
that revealed serious inconsistencies and structural weaknesses. I would
put the lessons of the Slump in the following way. First, countries with
high foreign debts and weak banking structures are vulnerable to
deﬂationary shocks. Second, the mechanisms of ﬁnancial contagion
transfer the weakness to creditor countries with previously sound bank-
ing systems. Third, one obvious transmission mechanism was the ﬁxed
exchange rate commitment, which created a potential for nimble inves-
tigators to get high returns on short-term deposits with the guaran-
tee—or the hope—that they could get out again. Does a diagnosis of the
1997 Asian crisis look much different?
The similarity of experiences raises the question that still confronts
would-be reformers: When is the best time to think about reform? It
might have been agreeable before the crisis, but then urgency about
reform was insufﬁcient. After the crisis, there were too many divergent
views. An intellectual and political paralysis set in. After the havoc of the
ﬁnancial crises of 1931 and 1932, which made the Depression the Great
Depression, the participants at the World Economic Conference in
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tary chaos (competitive devaluations, the imposition of exchange con-
trols) and by trade wars (the imposition of higher tariffs and quotas). In
preparation for the conference, subcommittees were established to inves-
tigate each of these questions. But the monetary committee reached the
conclusion that nothing could be done to stabilize money as long as free
trade principles did not prevail. The trade committee believed that there
was no point discussing trade liberalization without a prior currency
agreement. John Maynard Keynes wrote after the end of the conference
that it was inherently unlikely that 66 countries would agree on anything.
Only a “single power or like-minded group of powers” could ensure that
a promising plan would also be translated into reality (Skidelsky 1992,
p. 482).
POSTWAR EFFORTS AT REFORM
This is, of course, the key to the success of Bretton Woods. Only 44
rather than 66 countries were represented, and for practical purposes
there were only two. Perhaps one should say one. The negotiations
preceding the conference looked like bilateral diplomacy between Britain
and the United States, but of course the United States was massively
preponderant, and in every decisive issue the solution eventually
adopted was the American one. No controversy arose on the issue of
capital movements; everyone agreed that they were unlikely to take place
in the foreseeable future, and all the efforts were directed at achieving a
current account liberalization. And, ﬁnally, there was a clear time
constraint on the need to agree; the conference was held in July 1944, just
after the Normandy landings, when it was clear that the European War
would come to an end soon (most thought already in 1944). There was a
need to have a postwar institutional framework before the postwar
period actually began. The combination of the timing and the unique
position of the United States in that period explain why it is impossible to
achieve that dream of many reformers: “a new Bretton Woods.”
But on a more modest scale, a bilateral approach to negotiation, in
which one side was clearly more inﬂuential, has been the key to every
subsequent successful negotiation. After the collapse of the par value
system at the beginning of the 1970s, the major forum for negotiation was
at ﬁrst supposed to be the IMF’s Committee of Twenty, which was
intended to “consolidate all that earlier work and to build, as at Bretton
Woods, a complete design for an international monetary system that
would last for 25 years.” In practice, the C-20 rapidly became merely a
“multilateral monologue” (Morse 1974). The actual breakthrough came
instead in discussions between the American and French Treasuries,
which produced a formula that could then be used as a basis of
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1976 Jamaica meeting of the IMF.
A few years later, tortuous triangular negotiations on the future of
the European monetary order took place between the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany. These were suddenly simpliﬁed when Britain
dropped out, and France and Germany could negotiate along lines that
increasingly reﬂected a German view of the appropriate shape of the
European Monetary System. In the 1980s, the intense cooperative phase
of diplomacy between the Plaza and Louvre agreements was prepared by
Japanese-American negotiation, in which currency and trade-opening
agreements were bartered, each for the other.
THE NEED FOR CAUTION IN FUTURE REFORM MEASURES
As regards the present, the conclusions from such a historical survey
of debates on extensive reform are not comforting as to either the
prospects, or the likely outcome, of grand-scale architectural remodeling.
There may be a bilateral axis, which in the past has been the key to
pushing new projects through, but we should also ask what the likely
result would be.
At the end of the 1990s, the new bilateral relationship between
Europe and the United States is still unclear and, as in the past,
debates about trade measures continue to get confused with monetary
and currency issues (for example, the search for a weaker euro as a
way out of Europe’s unemployment malaise). The greatest risk is that
a solution which looks attractive to many European (and Japanese)
businesses—a move in the direction of ﬁxed exchange rates (coupled
with a lower valuation relative to the U.S. dollar)—is exactly the
wrong answer to the crises of most emerging markets. In this sense,
the bilateralization of ﬁnancial diplomacy, often the key to success in
achieving any outcome at all, may produce a very bad outcome indeed
for the world as a whole. The trade picture is obviously better and
more hopeful than that of the 1920s, but—as then—the trade area is
much more vulnerable to a multiplicity of political inﬂuences than is
the making of monetary policy.
While many of the ghosts of the Great Depression are still with us,
the fear of destabilizing capital ﬂows is predominant. Some protective or
regulatory measures are necessary to create sufﬁcient conﬁdence for the
functioning of any international order. The danger is that the buildup of
measures may be so substantial that there comes a moment—analogous
to the time when water turns to ice—when the quantitative shifts turn
into a qualitative shift, and the accumulated changes become harmful and
destroy the international system. The adoption of protective measures
during the Great Depression constituted such a moment. The legacy and
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international trade—highlight the danger that sometimes the remedies to
problems are worse than the problems themselves.
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